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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS OF THE INTERNATIONAL
MONETARY FUND
I. ,NEW CREDIT FACILITY FORMED BY IMF
On August 29, 1977, the IMF's Executive Board adopted a
decision creating the Witteveen facility, a supplementary financ-
ing facility, named after H. Johannes Witteveen, outgoing
Managing Director of the Fund. To date, $10 billion has been
pledged from 13 nations - 47 per cent to come from oil exporting
countries. The purpose of the new facility is to provide loans to
supplement existing IMF sources to nations suffering from serious
balance of payment deficits.'
The major sources of long term funds available for balance of
payments financing are member quotas. These quotas are the
total funds which each nation deposits with the IMF. The IMF
allows member nations to borrow currency from other member's
quotas against their own quotas. In this manner, members can
obtain an amount of any type of foreign currency equivalent in
value to their own quotas in order to finance trade.
The newly created supplementary financing facility is an
extension of the quota system. A member can use the new
supplementary financing facility only if it is borrowing against
one of its upper credit tranches2 and needs supplementary funds
1. IMF Decision No. 5508-(77/127) 1(a) (Adopted August 29, 1977)
(hereinafter cited as IMF Decision). Expected member contributions, expressed in
millions of special drawings rights are as follows:
*Abu Dhabi 150 Netherlands 100
Belgium 150 *Qatar 100
Canada 200 *Saudi Arabia 2,150
West Germany 1,050 Swiss National Bank 650
*Iran 685 United States 1,450
Japan 900 *Venezuela 450
*Kuwait 400
Oil Exporters indicated by asterisk (*).
See IMF SURVEY, September 5, 1977, at 273. Note that 22.9 per cent of the pledges
come from Germany and Japan. Until recently these two nations have run large
balance of payments surpluses. See THE ECONOMIST, September 24, 1977, at 89.
2. For a general discussion of the traditional IMF borrowing mechanism, see
I. WALTER, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS 451-459 (2d ed. 1975). For details of the
credit rules on credit tranch borrowing, see generally, INT'L MONETARY FUND, By-
LAws, RULES AND REGULATIONS (July 15, 1975).
(400)
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to finance a balance of payments deficit. Payments on Witteveen
loans commence within three and a half years of acquisition and
must be completed within seven. By combining supplementary
financing facility borrowing with quota borrowing, a Fund
member can receive up to 140 per cent of the value of its quota in
foreign currency.3
Aside from generally expanding world credit, this facility
extends IMF supervision over the lending of surplus funds from
nations with balance of payment surpluses, such as the oil
exporters, to nations with balance of payments deficits, such as
the developing countries. 4 The facility is an attraction to the
lenders because it provides a secure repository of their surplus
funds as well as relatively high interest rates.5 It eliminates the
need to go through private middlemen. Moreover, the IMF does
not compete for loans and will only approve loans with terms
favorable to economic adjustment.
When a nation borrows from the new facility it must provide
assurances that it is taking economic steps to reverse its balance
of payments deficits. Opponents of the facility fear that IMF
intervention will so improve the borrowing nation's credit position
that the resulting inflow of private capital will be a disincentive
for it to actually take the economic steps necessary to maintain a
stable balance of payments. The IMF believes, however, that such
a reaction is unlikely given the recent experiences of IMF lending
to the United Kingdom, Mexico and Italy. Nevertheless, the IMF
reserves the power to coerce the borrowing nations into taking
corrective measures when they are necessary.
The creation of the facility becomes effective when loan
agreements are entered into for a total amount of not less than
Special Drawing Rights (SDR) 7.75 billion, including at least six
agreements, each of which provides for an amount not less than
3. IMF Decision, at 6(a).
4. For general background on the economic basis of the new facility, see
International Debt: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on International Finance of
the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, United States Senate,
95th Cong., 1st Seas. 58 (1977) (Statement of Richard N. Cooper, Under Secretary of
State for Economic Affairs).
5. The Fund will pay 7 per cent interest until June 30, 1978. For each six
month period thereafter, the interest rate will be equal to the average yield for that
period on U.S. Government securities of at least five year term. See IMF Decision
at 2.
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SDR 500 million.8 The Witteveen facility is temporary, and may be
abandoned at the next conference to increase member quotas.7
However, extended balance of payments financing is presently
necessary as deficits remain widespread despite the recent switch
by world economies to flexible exchange rates. It is anticipated
that deficits will continue as the world adjusts to the huge oil price
increases of the past several years. After this adjustment, flexible
exchange rates should curtail balance of payment deficits.8
Meanwhile, the Witteveen facility will stand ready to provide
supplemental aid to nations with imbalances.
II. THE STATUS OF THE PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO THE
IMF's ARTICLES OF AGREEMENT
The Second Amendment 9 to the Articles of Agreement
proposed in January of 1976 in Jamaica (the Jamaican Agree-
ment) took effect on April 1, 1978.10 The Amendment represents
the culmination of nearly five years of negotiations" started in
response to the international financial crisis of 1971 and the
subsequent abandonment of the Bretton Woods agreement and
fixed exchange rates.12 Article 4 of the Second Amendment
includes provisions to sanction the existing floating exchange rate
system, and to reduce the importance of gold as the basis of
international reserves. 13
The most significant aspect of the Amendment is the creation
of rules of conduct for nations regarding their international
6. Id., at 13.
7. The results of the last conference are still pending ratification by the
membership. The plan would increase total membership quotas from SDR 29.2
billion to SDR 39 billion, in proportion to existing quotas. The plan has been
approved by only 44.11 per cent of the required 75 per cent of the votes.
8. For an explanation of the balance of payments adjustment process under
flexible exchange rates, see, eg., I. WALTER, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS Ch. 22
(2d ed. 1975), cf., Ch. 21 (on fixed exchange rates).
9. International Monetary Fund, Proposed Second Amendment to the
Articles of Agreement, Articles of Agreement, April 29, 1976, 15 INT'L LEGAL MATS.
499.
10. Wall Street Journal, March 31, 1978, p. 5, col. 1.
11. For a general discussion of the particulars of the Jamaican Agreement, see
NATIONAL ADVISORY COUNCIL, INTERNATIONAL FINANCE 23-24 (House Document
No. 95-67).
12. For a discussion of proposed monetary alternatives and the Bretton Woods
system, see I. WALTER, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS 460-480 (2d ed. 1975).
13. See 2 INT'L. TRADE L. J. 252 (1977).
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monetary policies, with the IMF monitoring these rules. The IMF
has developed three principles to guide implementation of
exchange rate policies:
(1) A member shall avoid manipulating exchange rates in
order to prevent effective balance of payments adjustments
or to gain unfair competitive advantages over other
members;
(2) A member should intervene when necessary to counter
disorderly conditions;
(3) Members should take into account in their intervention
policies the interests of other members, including those
countries whose currency is the object of the intervention."
Exchange rate manipulation consists of intervention by a
nation's central bank in the foreign exchange market in order to
significantly affect the supply and demand for that nation's
currency. Such interference can be used for protectionist purposes
by raising the price of imports entering the country and lowering
the price of exports. Experience with flexible exchange rates has
shown that manipulation can be advantageous to a country, but
in ways which subvert the goal of international cooperation and
orderly balance of payments adjustments. One nation's gain is
another's loss and ultimately through retaliation comparative
advantage is lost and underlying economic conditions distorted.
The first guideline is drafted in an effort to avoid such
manipulation by IMF members. The second guideline approves of
intervention to counter disorderly conditions. These conditions are
short-term fluctuations which have no relation to underlying long-
term economic conditions and are largely the result of chance
happenings. Flexible exchange rate theory ignores the possibility
of disorderly conditions because of the simplicity of the model. In
the real world, however, such conditions occur and nations need
sufficient flexibility to allow intervention and stabilization of
short-term fluctuations.
Nevertheless, intervention under disorderly conditions should
not be taken lightly. Manipulation of exchange rates can have
adverse effects on the nation whose currency is intervened. From
14. International Monetary Fund, supra note 9, at Art. IV, Sec. 3, 15 INT'L
LEGAL MATS. 549. See IMF Executive Board, Surveillance over Exchange Policies
(Guidelines in Implementing the Second Amendment).
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a world perspective it would be futile for a nation which is
attempting to lower exchange rates and to ward off a balance of
payments deficit to intervene in a currency of a nation with the
same problem. The third guideline tells nations to give due
consideration to the effects of intervention on other countries.
In summary, the IMF would like its members to float their
currencies to achieve long-term economic adjustments. At the
same time, however, intervention to counter short-term fluctua-
tions is encouraged. With the adoption of the Second Amendment,
the IMF becomes the monitor of what will hopefully be a more
stable system of flexible exchange rates.
15
Douglas J. Antonio
15. For a discussion of the limitations and possibilities of the IMF after the
Jamaican Agreement, see G. Halm, Jamaica and the Par-Value System, in
PRINCETON ESSAYS IN INTERNATIONAL FINANCE No. 120 at 19-20 (March 1977).
